Chapter VI
Signatures and trust
Proving who wrote something, and deciding whose public key to believe in the first place.
Digital signatures
Sign with the private key, verify with the public key. Anyone can check, only one party could have signed.
A MAC (chapter III) proves integrity, but whoever holds the shared key could have made it, the receiver included. A signature can only come from the private key, and anyone can check it.
Your public key generating…. The private key was generated in this page and cannot be exported.
RSA, ECDSA, Ed25519
Real schemes sign a hash of the message. ECDSA needs a fresh secret nonce every time; Ed25519 derives it deterministically.
Every scheme signs a hash z of the message. RSA raises the padded hash to d (PSS). ECDSA outputs a pair (r, s), with r taken from the point k·G of a fresh secret nonce k:
The man in the middle
An unauthenticated key exchange can end with a perfectly secret channel to the attacker.
The way out is a key Alice trusts beforehand: compared out loud (Signal’s safety numbers), remembered from the first connection (SSH), or vouched for by a certificate.
Certificates
A certificate says “this public key belongs to this name”, signed by a certificate authority whose own certificate chains up to a root you trust.
Lifetimes keep shrinking so that mistakes expire fast: Let’s Encrypt made 90 days ordinary, and by 2029 the cap falls to 47 days.
The chain of trust
A site sends its certificate and its intermediates. Your device checks each signature up to a root it already holds.
Roots keep their keys offline and sign intermediates, which sign sites day to day.
An illustrative chain: your browser visits www.example.com on 2026-10-19.
Leaf, sent by the server
- Subject
- www.example.com
- Issuer
- Example Issuing CA
- Public key
- 5827 da27 bf6e …
- Valid until
- 2026-12-29
Intermediate, sent too
- Subject
- Example Issuing CA
- Issuer
- Example Root CA
- Public key
- 1b19 2dad 9985 …
- Valid until
- 2032-02-29
Root, in your trust store
- Subject
- Example Root CA
- Issuer
- Example Root CA
- Public key
- 4fce 2dd4 87f3 …
- Valid until
- 2044-12-31
- Passed: www.example.com is one of the leaf's names
- Passed: www.example.com is valid on 2026-10-19
- Passed: Example Issuing CA is valid on 2026-10-19
- Passed: www.example.com is signed by Example Issuing CA
- Passed: Example Issuing CA is allowed to issue certificates
- Passed: Example Root CA is in the trust store
- Passed: Example Issuing CA is signed by that trusted root
AcceptedThe padlock appears and the page loads.
Certificate Transparency
Every public certificate is written to append-only public logs, so a certificate issued by mistake or by an attacker gets noticed.
In 2011 an intruder at DigiNotar issued at least 531 rogue certificates, one for *.google.com, used against users in Iran. Now a CA must log every certificate in public, append-only logs, and embed their signed receipts, SCTs.
In one breath
- Digital signatures. Sign with the private key, verify with the public key. Anyone can check, only one party could have signed.
- RSA, ECDSA, Ed25519. Real schemes sign a hash of the message. ECDSA needs a fresh secret nonce every time; Ed25519 derives it deterministically.
- The man in the middle. An unauthenticated key exchange can end with a perfectly secret channel to the attacker.
- Certificates. A certificate says “this public key belongs to this name”, signed by a certificate authority whose own certificate chains up to a root you trust.
- The chain of trust. A site sends its certificate and its intermediates. Your device checks each signature up to a root it already holds.
- Certificate Transparency. Every public certificate is written to append-only public logs, so a certificate issued by mistake or by an attacker gets noticed.